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ABSTRACT 
 
Wickard v Filburn and US v Lopez: Two Sides of the Same Coin? (May 2013) 
 
Charles Raymond Arvin 
Department of Political Science 
Department of Economics 
Texas A&M University 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. James Rogers 
Department of Political Science 
 
 
The Supreme Court’s commerce clause jurisprudence represents a balance between ideology and 
institutional constraints. In this work, I examine to what extent ideology and institutional 
constraints affect the Court’s jurisprudence. As these cases often feature conflict between the 
states and the federal government, these cases also have important implications for federalism. 
Using an original dataset of all Supreme Court commerce clause cases from 1939-2012, the 
effect of ideology is examined, both as a whole and during individual Court “eras”. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent scholarship in the field of judicial politics has emphasized the importance of motivating 
factors in understanding judicial behavior. One such factor, policy preferences, has been 
thoroughly outlined and rigorously tested with generally positive results (see, for example, Segal 
and Spaeth 1993, 2002, Pritchett 1941, Heck 1981, Banks and Blakeman 2012). While the 
results from this attitudinal model have been very powerful, some scholars have highlighted the 
need to consider other influences, including precedent and institutional constraints, in addition to 
attitudinal predictions (see, respectively, Kastellec 2010 and Clark 2011).  
In this work, I seek to add evidence that precedent and institutional constraints do matter to 
justices. Beyond this, I seek to demonstrate that purely attitudinal models, though adept in some 
instances, suffer from a fatal flaw: namely, that many cases have conflicting policies at play. In 
cases where justices are pulled in different directions by these different policy dimensions, 
attitudinal predictions are theoretically unsound and empirically suspect. 
Because this work focuses on the effects of precedent and institutional constraints, I examine the 
Supreme Court’s commerce clause jurisprudence. The commerce clause has a number of 
important features which make it ideal for this study. First, commerce clause cases generally 
involve multiple policy dimensions (for example, a given case involves both an assessment of 
the policy and an assessment of the actor, whether federal or local, implementing the policy). In 
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cases where these different dimensions diverge, attitudinal predictions are unsound and fail to 
predict with any significant accuracy as the results demonstrate. 
Beyond this, the commerce clause has a relatively clear precedent that has remained largely 
unchanged over time. Although no precedent has gone completely unchanged, the general trend 
has remained the same throughout its many eras: specifically, that the clause is to regulate and 
prevent states from imposing economic externalities upon the other states (Carrubba and Rogers 
2003). Equally importantly, this precedent is fairly unambiguous as the Court can generally see 
such harms through the use of amicus curiae briefs. When many states petition the Court in 
opposition to a given policy, they send a clear signal that the policy does harm interstate 
commerce. Likewise, when many states support a given policy, the opposite signal is sent. This 
clear precedent allows a glimpse into the effect of precedent on court output. 
As the following discussion will expand upon, I argue that attitudinal perspectives are incapable 
of explaining the Court’s commerce clause jurisprudence. Instead, the Court uses signals sent 
from the federal government and state governments to ensure that negative externalities on 
interstate commerce are removed. Through the use of statistical analysis and classification trees, 
this work finds evidence that amicus briefs are significantly more adept at explaining judicial 
outcomes than traditional ideological concerns. Furthermore, this evidence supports the claim 
that the Court applies these signals in a manner consistent with commerce clause precedent. 
This work consists of 5 sections. In Section II, I present a history of the commerce clause, tracing 
the growth of the commerce clause throughout history. In Section III, I expound upon the theory 
underlying this work. In Section IV, the methodology and results are presented. Substantive 
conclusions are developed in Section V. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORY 
 
Origins and early years 
Any adequate history of the Commerce Clause must begin several years before the clause was 
ever penned. Indeed, the origins of the commerce power stem in great part from the failed 
Articles of Confederation, the more decentralized precursor to our current Constitution. As 
Justice Stevens noted in the majority opinion in Gonzales vs Raich, the Clause was envisioned as 
a response to the inherent weakness of the Articles: that of economic Balkanization, in which 
states could issue their own currencies and impose trade barriers, greatly obstructing interstate 
trade (545 U.S. 1, 16). This problem was frequently addressed by various influential figures at 
the time of the adoption of the Constitution, especially in various Federalist papers. In Federalist 
42, James Madison argued that without an overarching Federal commerce power, economic 
protectionism would inevitably lead to “unceasing animosities…and serious interruptions of the 
public tranquility.” (Federalist 42).  Likewise, Federalist 22 asserts that “there is no object…that 
more strongly demands a federal superintendence.” (Federalist 22). 
It was in this environment of economic warfare that the framers of the Constitution adopted 
Article I, Section 8, which includes, among other provisions, the power “to regulate commerce 
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.” This newly found 
power created many questions for the fledgling government, especially in regards to state powers 
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with respect to commerce. Was this an exclusive grant of power to Congress and, if not, where 
did the boundaries lie? 
The Supreme Court’s first major step towards answering these questions came in Gibbons vs 
Ogden, in which the state of New York issued an exclusive grant of rights to the waterways in 
the state. Chief Justice John Marshall painted the Commerce power in a very broad light, 
providing that the power was limited not only to commercial transactions but also to regulations 
of navigation, a vital part of interstate regulation. Furthermore, dicta in the opinion suggested 
that the clause was to be understood in a “plenary” manner, “[acknowledging] no limitations 
other than are prescribed in the Constitution.” (22 U.S. 1, 196-7). At the same time, however, a 
distinction was made between interstate commerce and “the purely internal commerce of a 
State.” (Id., at 204). This distinction between interstate commerce and intrastate commerce 
represented the first of many such distinctions in the Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 
Interestingly, the Court began to move away from the broad understanding of the commerce 
power espoused in Gibbons relatively quickly. In Cooley vs Board of Wardens, for example, a 
regulation requiring the hiring of a local pilot to enter or leave Philadelphia was upheld despite 
the obvious effects on navigation, an interstate issue. Instead, the Court suggested that the 
Congressional power was “compatible with the existence of a similar power in the states”, 
indicating that commerce could be regulated by states as long as Congressional action did not 
preempt such regulations. (53 U.S. 299, 318). Similarly, Munn vs Illinois allowed states to 
regulate, among other things, warehouses which are used by others engaged in interstate 
commerce. These cases and others outlined a “negative implication” of the Commerce power, 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, which allowed certain state regulations on interstate commerce 
to pass Constitutional muster. 
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The Gibbons decision also raised a significant question about defining exactly what “internal 
commerce of a State” was. Decisions like Munn highlight the close proximity between interstate 
and internal commerce. In that case, the warehouses themselves were internal commerce, even 
though they were frequently used by interstate companies and the regulations “may indirectly 
operate upon commerce outside its immediate jurisdiction.” (94 U.S. 113, 135). By contrast, Hall 
vs DeCuir extended federal control to preempt legislation regulating the presence of blacks and 
whites within the same ship cabin as a result of its effects on transportation among states. 
E.C. Knight and the current of commerce 
In an effort to resolve such questions, the Court moved to a new standard, in which some 
activities, like transportation, were interstate, while others, like manufacturing, were necessarily 
internal commerce. This theory focused chiefly on the type of economic activity taking place. In 
Kidd vs Pearson, for example, the manufacture of alcohol did not qualify as interstate commerce 
until it had ”been shipped or entered with a common carrier for transportation to another state” 
(12 U.S. 1, 25). Likewise, in United States vs E.C. Knight Company, a monopoly in 
manufacturing alone was not sufficient to prove that such a monopoly obstructed interstate 
commerce. Under this more formalistic theory, Congress could only regulate those goods which 
has entered interstate commerce.  
In Kidd, then, states could prohibit the manufacture of goods within their state, but regulations 
regarding the importation of such goods might not pass Constitutional muster. Similarly, in E.C. 
Knight, had the Sherman Antitrust Act been used to control the distribution, rather than the 
production of goods, the results may have differed. This theory offered a straightforward (if 
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somewhat unsatisfying) means of separating internal from interstate commerce and determining 
where Congressional power extended.  
However, flaws soon became apparent in cases like Swift and Co. vs United States, when the 
Court struggled to differentiate the sugar monopoly in E.C. Knight from other monopolies. 
Although the Court admitted that the two cases “are near to each other”, the antitrust actions in 
Swift were ultimately upheld as a result of their focus on sales and distribution rather than the 
manufacture of goods, a distinction that ultimately raised more questions than answers (196 U.S. 
375, 396). Nonetheless, the Swift approach, also known as the “current of commerce” theory, 
was adopted and used in cases like Stafford vs Wallace, regulating meat stockyards as a vital 
choke point through which the interstate meat trade must pass. This approach provided Congress 
with the power to not only regulate good crossing state lines, but also extended to those activities 
that served as vital stops in this current of commerce. Adoption of this approach resulted in the 
minimization, though never outright abandonment, of the decision in E.C. Knight over the 
subsequent decades. 
The Lochner era 
This more expansive definition of commerce was greatly narrowed during the Lochner era, a 
period in Court history where the Court took a staunch stance in favor of free markets. Although 
this era applied primarily to equal protections and due process concerns, there was certainly 
spillover into the realm of the Commerce Clause. Although Congress was allowed to regulate so-
called “societal evils” like lottery tickets and alcohol in interstate commerce (see Champion vs 
Ames), the Court struck down many regulations like child labor laws. 
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In Hammer vs Dagenhart, the Court struck down a law prohibiting the interstate trade of goods 
produced with excessive child labor, holding that such a law exceeded Congressional power to 
regulate commerce. In one of the relatively few Court opinions to ever be explicitly overruled, 
the Hammer court distinguished the production of cotton, even cotton produced by child labor, 
from the societal evils described above. According to the Hammer Court, because the production 
of cotton itself was not immoral and the Court had previously held production to be outside 
Congressional purview, the regulation in question could not be upheld. 
The new deal 
Of course, it takes little awareness to see that child labor is now largely illegal, a change that 
came about largely as a result of the expansive understanding of the Commerce Clause which 
marked the New Deal era. In an effort to reverse the damage done by the Great Depression, 
President Roosevelt signed into law numerous pieces of legislation intended to regulate interstate 
commerce. These broad pieces of legislation set up significant conflicts between the Court and 
the President, best illustrated by the (perhaps apocryphal) stories of the Court’s sudden “switch” 
in response to the threat of a court-packing scheme proposed by Roosevelt himself. 
Regardless of the historical accuracy of the switch, the Court did initially position itself as an 
opponent to much of the early New Deal legislation. Carter vs Carter Coal Company struck 
down regulations of labor practices and pricing schemes for the coal industry, relying on the 
distinction between production and sales in E.C. Knight. Schechter Poultry Corp. vs United 
States similarly struck down regulations on the poultry industry due to Schecter’s almost 
complete reliance on intrastate rather than interstate commerce. Because any effects on interstate 
commerce would be minimal and indirect, the Court disposed of the regulations. 
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Over time, however, the Court began to signal a clear shift away from such rigid and limited 
definitions of interstate commerce, moving instead to the standards proposed in National Labor 
Relations Board vs Jones and Laughlin Steel. Jones largely abandoned both the “current of 
commerce” theory as well as the distinction between production and distribution. Instead, the 
Court defined Congressional reach to include any activities which were likely to burden or 
obstruct interstate commerce. Thus, even labor disputes at a single production facility, the issue 
in Jones, could fall within interstate commerce as long as some burdensome effect resulted. 
The shift became even more apparent in United States vs Darby, in which the Court unanimously 
overturned Hammer, condemning its “departure from the principles which have prevailed in the 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause both before and since the decision.” (312 U.S. 100, 116-
7). The Fair Labor Standards Act, which set, among other things, a minimum wage which had 
been rejected by previous Courts, was upheld as a valid regulation of interstate commerce. 
Finally, in Wickard vs Filburn, the Court offered what many have called the most expansive 
view of the Commerce Clause in history. In Wickard, the Agricultural Adjustment Act was 
upheld, imposing a tax on all farmers who grew more than their allotted quota of wheat. 
Surprisingly, however, the Act was enforceable even against individual farmers who disposed of 
the wheat not by the market mechanism but by simply feeding it to their animals. In the opinion, 
the Court strongly rejected the notions of direct and indirect effects and local activities, which 
were dismissed as “a few dicta”. (317 U.S. 111, 119). The Court also rejected the formulaic 
approaches of the past, stating that “a review of the course of decision under the Commerce 
Clause will make plain…that questions of the power of Congress are not to be decided by 
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reference to any formula.” (Id. at 120). In the Wickard decision, observers could see all of the 
various shifts which came about during the New Deal era. 
Civil rights and interstate commerce 
This expansive understanding of the Commerce Clause continued to be utilized several decades 
later, as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other legislation sought to force racial equality onto 
otherwise reticent businesses. In both Katzenbach vs McClung and Heart of Atlanta Motel vs 
United States, the Court unanimously upheld the Civil Rights Act, prohibiting both restaurants 
and hotels from engaging in racial discrimination with regards to their customers.  
In both cases, the substantial effect on interstate commerce necessary was satisfied as a result of 
their proximity to and reliance on interstate trade.  Both establishments were located near 
interstate highways, and the Congressional record showed evidence “that this…discrimination 
had the effect of discouraging travel on the part of a substantial portion of the Negro 
community.” By this point, decades had passed since the commerce clause had been restricted by 
the Court, and scholars and jurists alike began to conclude that the Commerce Clause had grown 
into a virtually unlimited source of Congressional power. 
Modern commerce clause jurisprudence 
Of course, as recounted in the introduction, such conventional wisdom was shattered with the 
decision in United States vs Lopez, which limited the Commerce power for the first time in 
decades. While not abandoning the approaches of the New Deal and Civil Rights-era Courts, the 
Lopez decision drew a novel distinction between “economic activity” and, implicitly, 
noneconomic activity like the possession of a handgun in a school zone. Although possession of 
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a handgun may in fact have an effect on interstate commerce, the Court held, such possession 
was not economic activity. Therefore, Congress exceeded its powers in passing the GFSZA. 
Similar logic was employed in United States vs Morrison five years later. Although Congress 
presented voluminous records demonstrating a link between domestic violence, the Court again 
found that domestic violence is noneconomic in nature and struck down the Violence Against 
Women Act. In so doing, the Court sent a clear signal that this economic activity distinction was 
more than passing dicta, but questions still remained regarding the impact of this distinction. It 
seemed straightforward that roadside hotels and ship travel would qualify as economic activity, 
but what of growing wheat or engaging in labor disputes? Neither issue lent itself to clear 
categorization under this new distinction.  
The Court’s decision in Gonzales vs Raich in 2005 strongly suggested that older precedents like 
Wickard continued to be good law despite recent doubt. In fact, the inherent similarities between 
Raich and Wickard, which both focused on individuals growing commodity crops, led the Court 
to employ a close parallel to the logic of its predecessor sixty years before. This tantalizing 
glimpse into the ramifications of this new distinction, though important, will nonetheless need to 
be refined further to understand exactly what Lopez and Morrison meant to the Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
The attitudinal model 
Since Segal and Spaeth’s (1993, 2002) seminal work on the attitudinal model, the question of 
policy preferences has been an important component of judicial politics. For attitudinalists, 
judges operate in much the same way as other political actors: specifically, they seek to decide 
cases in a manner consistent with their policy preferences. Thus, conservative judges decide 
cases in a conservative manner, while liberal judges do the opposite. This intuitive model finds 
support in a number of works, including (Segal and Cover 1989, Brisbin 1996, Hagle and Spaeth 
1991, 1993). While some scholarship suggests that ideology is the predominant factor (see Unah 
and Hancock 2006, Spaeth and Segal 1999, Rohde and Spaeth 1976), others envision ideology as 
one factor among many (see Bartels 2009, Collins 2008, Lindquist and Klein 2006). 
How would an ideologically driven Court address commerce clause cases? Two possibilities 
exist. Many measures of judicial ideology, including the Supreme Court Database, classify 
commerce clause decisions as conservative if they are decided in favor of the states and liberal if 
they are decided in favor of the federal government. This can lead to some questionable 
classifications. For example, Perez vs United States is classified as a liberal decision despite 
upholding a conviction (traditionally a conservative ruling). Likewise, United States vs Lopez is 
classified as a conservative decision despite reversing a conviction.  
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On the other hand, it is possible that conservative justices vote against regulations from either the 
federal or local governments. This classification scheme is able to intuitively classify both cases 
above. Thus, are justices primarily concerned with the content of the law, or with the level of 
government which passed the law?  
A priori, it is impossible to determine whether schemes like those used in the Supreme Court 
Database are accurate or not. In order to test which is more accurate, we can test Hypotheses 1 
and 2. 
Hypothesis 1: As judges become more liberal, they are more likely to support federal action and 
to oppose state action. As judges become more conservative, they are more likely to support state 
action and to oppose federal action. 
Hypothesis 2: As judges become more liberal, they are more likely to support regulatory action 
from either the federal government or the states. As judges become more conservative, they are 
less likely to support regulatory action from either level. 
The legal model 
Some social scientists, and many legal scholars, emphasize the importance of legal factors like 
precedent on judicial outcomes (see Clark 2013, Gilman 1999, 2001, Kahn 1999). Although the 
commerce clause has gone through a number of different tests and eras, a number of scholars 
have noted that these tests all contain the same core concern: removing impediments to interstate 
commerce (see Bork and Troy 2001, Dowling 1940). While these impediments are generally 
associated with state action (for example, Bibb vs Navajo Freight Lines), the Court has also 
struck down federal regulation that is beyond the scope of the federal government (for example, 
in United States vs Lopez and, more recently, National Federation of Independent Businesses vs 
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Sebelius). Although the tests may have changed, the principle behind the tests has been fairly 
consistent. 
How then does the Court know when a burden to interstate commerce exists? In this paper, I 
propose that the Court uses the presence of amicus briefs to indicate when a law is harmful. The 
filing of an amicus brief is a costly endeavor, requiring significant amounts of effort. Because 
these briefs are not simple cheap talk but instead a costly signal, the Court can use these to 
indicate when laws are sufficiently harmful as to burden interstate commerce. A brief from either 
the states or the federal government sends a clear signal that the law in question is imposing 
significant economic costs and needs to be struck down. For federal regulations, the same 
principle applies. When states choose to oppose a federal regulation, they are signaling that 
Washington is overstepping its bounds and harming interstate commerce. 
Importantly, this measure of harm comports perfectly with the Court’s traditional test in dormant 
commerce clause cases. For dormant commerce clause cases, the Court has traditionally 
employed a balancing test to determine whether the state’s benefits clearly outweigh the harms to 
interstate commerce (see Pike vs Bruce Church and Kassel vs Consolidated Freightways 
Corporation). Thus, incidental harms are not unconstitutional. Instead, it is only when those 
harms are substantial that the Court becomes concerned. As amicus briefs are unlikely to be filed 
for mere incidental harms, this test comports with the use of amicus briefs as a signal to the 
Court. 
If these precedents are an important factor in the Court’s decision-making process, we should 
expect to see laws struck down with greater frequency if other governmental actors signal 
opposition to the law. This leads to Hypothesis 3. 
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Hypothesis 3: The presence of one or more amicus briefs from other governmental actors 
opposing a law should decrease the likelihood of the law being upheld. 
Scholarship also suggests that state regulations face a substantially higher burden of proof than 
federal regulations. (see Denning 2008, Farber and Hudec 1994, Tushnet 1979) While federal 
regulations must generally withstand only rational basis review. For example, the Court held in 
United States vs Lopez that the Court has “undertaken to decide whether a rational basis existed 
for concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce.” By contrast, 
local regulations must generally withstand a more heightened level of scrutiny. Laws which do 
not discriminate against interstate commerce must still withstand the above balancing test, while 
laws which have a discriminatory purpose or effect are considered under strict scrutiny, the 
Court’s most exacting standard.  
If precedent is an important factor, we should expect to see federal regulations upheld at a higher 
rate than state regulations. This leads to Hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, the Court should be more likely to uphold federal regulations than 
state regulations. 
Unifying these two models 
The next important step is to develop a way of testing both of these models into one consistent 
model. Specifically, it is important to detail how a Court might act if they are motivated by both 
ideology and precedent. For a Court which values both ideology and precedent, justices are 
likely to be confronted with cases in which ideology and precedent pull them toward different 
outcomes. In these cases, a number of possibilities exist. Justices might simply adhere to 
ideology or precedent exclusively and rule in that manner. However, they might also engage in a 
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more nuanced process, where they balance their interests. A liberal justice, for example, might be 
unwilling to strike down a given law, while they would be willing to do so if there was evidence 
of interstate harm. In this way, the justice’s final position in the policy space is a mix of 
ideological and precedential concerns.  
While it seems likely that each justice might engage in different processes, where some value 
ideology, some precedent, and some fall in between, this work does not seek to answer that 
question. Future iterations in which the unit of analysis is the justice vote rather than the case 
outcome may be able to shed more light on this question. 
Nonetheless, through this operationalization of precedent, both models can be tested at the same 
time. By analyzing the effects of precedent, ideology and any interactions between the two, both 
of these models can be empirically tested. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MEASURES AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
Dependent variable 
In this section, we test the above hypotheses. The data used is drawn from all Supreme Court 
commerce clause and dormant commerce clause cases from 1937-2012, a total of 188 cases. The 
unit of analysis is the case. 
My dependent variable, For Action, is a measure of the outcome of a given case. If the Court 
rules to uphold a regulation, regardless of the origin of the regulation, this variable is coded as a 
1. If the Court strikes down a regulation, this variable is coded as a 0.  
Note that these measures do not address the nature of the regulation. For example, pro-business 
and pro-union regulations are both judged on one characteristic: whether the regulation was 
upheld. Importantly, these values are significantly different from outcome-based measures used 
elsewhere, including the Supreme Court Database, because of this emphasis, avoiding problems 
of endogeneity. 
Independent variables 
In order to test attitudinal predictions, the first independent variable, Ideology, is a measure of a 
justice’s policy preferences. Drawn from the Martin-Quinn ideology scores, I use the median 
member to determine the Court’s overall ideology (see Martin and Quinn 2002 and Martin, 
Quinn and Epstein 2005). Although these are vote-based scores, they rely on the traditional 
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liberal/conservative dichotomy rather than the more specific measure used here. Although 
endogeneity is an unavoidable problem, this distinction should make the problem minimal. 
The variable Local Action is a simple measure of the source of the law at issue. For cases 
involving local regulations, this variable is coded as a 1. If the case involves federal regulation, 
this variable is coded as a 0.  
In order to test the precedential model, I use four variables, drawn from the amicus briefs and 
counsel arguing before the Court. Federal Conflict is coded as a 1 in cases where the federal 
government opposes one or more local governments (through either amicus briefs or counsel) 
and a 0 otherwise. Federal Support is coded as a 1 in cases where the federal government sides 
with one or more local governments and a 0 otherwise. Local Conflict is coded as a 1 in cases 
where one or more local governments oppose another local government and a 0 otherwise. Local 
Support is coded as a 1 in cases where one or more local governments side with another local 
government and a 0 otherwise. 
 To illustrate these variables, consider a few landmark cases. In United States vs Lopez, both 
Federal Conflict and Federal Support would be coded as a 1 as states filed amicus briefs both 
supporting and opposing the GFSZA. In Bibb vs Navajo Freight Lines, Local Conflict would be 
coded as a 1 because states filed amicus briefs opposing the Illinois law. In South Carolina State 
Highway Department vs Barnwell Brothers, both Federal Conflict and Local Support are coded 
as a 1, as the federal government opposed South Carolina while other local governments 
supported South Carolina. 
As the results section explains, these can be condensed into two broader variables, Conflict and 
Support. Conflict is coded as a 1 if either Federal Conflict or Local Conflict are coded as a 1, and 
20 
a 0 otherwise. Support is coded as a 1 either Federal Support or Local Support are coded as a 1, 
and a 0 otherwise. 
These variables have direct roots in precedent. Preparing and filing an amicus brief is a costly 
endeavor, so a brief opposing a regulation signals to the Court that significant harms exist as a 
result of the regulation in question. Because the commerce clause is a tool to remove harms from 
interstate commerce, this signal should lower the likelihood of success, regardless of the source 
of the regulation or opposition. The opposite is true for briefs supporting a regulation. Such 
action communicates that the regulation in question benefits interstate commerce and need not be 
removed, a valuable signal. 
As a final point, the use of amicus briefs and counsel was selected because of the unambiguous 
and predictive nature of these measures. As scholars have noted regarding various jurisprudential 
elements, justices have the discretion of citing favorable factors while omitting unfavorable 
factors (see Fowler et al. 2007, Fowler and Jeon 2008). Thus, it is possible, for example, that 
justices looking to rule in favor of a local regulation might not mention the externalities imposed 
in their opinion. However, they cannot hide the amicus briefs indicating these harms. Amicus 
briefs and participation offer a clear, reliable and replicable signal of interstate externalities. 
The value of precedent 
I begin by examining the effect of precedent on commerce clause jurisprudence. I present the 
results for model 1 and model 2 in Table 1. 
Model 1 presents a simple view of commerce clause precedent. In this model, both Federal 
Conflict and Local Conflict are combined into one indicator variable, Conflict. The same process 
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was done for the variable Support. Conflict has a substantive and statistically significant effect 
on the likelihood of a decision supporting a regulation.  
Beyond this, local and federal actions are treated in a fundamentally different manner, with the 
burden of proof significantly higher for local actions. There is a clear and statistically significant 
presumption against local regulation relative to federal regulation. This finding confirms that 
federal regulations are more likely to pass constitutional scrutiny. 
Model 2 presents the same precedent analysis but does not combine the conflict and support 
variables. As Table 1 indicates, not all conflict is equal. Instead, Federal Conflict remains 
substantively and statistically significant, while Local Conflict does not reach statistical 
significance. Neither support variable reaches significance.  
This is a surprising finding. Although scholars have framed the commerce clause as protection 
from the states for the states (see Smith 1986, O’Grady 1997), this seems to suggest that the 
critical issue is one of federalism. There is only a significant effect in cases where the federal 
government opposes a local regulation or vice versa: local governments opposing one another 
shows little effect. 
Even more surprisingly, neither support variable is significant. While support from other 
governmental actors might be expected to increase the likelihood of success, these data show no 
statistical or substantive effect of briefs written in support of a regulation. While the source of 
this surprising finding is unclear, it may be the case that states have a sort of economic quid pro 
quo, where both support policies that are advantageous for each (i.e. states with major ports 
support licensing restrictions passed by ports in other states). Nonetheless, this is a finding in 
need of explanation. 
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Overall, this data largely confirm the expectations drawn from legal scholarship. The Court’s 
decisions present strong evidence that local actions are judged under a higher standard than 
federal actions. In addition, the Court clearly uses the conflict between local and federal 
governments as a signal indicating harm to interstate commerce.  
Precedent and ideology 
In Table 2, I present results when ideology is included in the analysis. 
Importantly, Ideology is statistically significant, as is Conflict and StateAction. When Conflict is 
split, as above, the same effect is observed. In order to test whether local action is treated 
differently by conservative or liberal courts, Model 5 includes an interaction term between 
Ideology and Local Action. Figure 1 presents the predicted probability of success for local and 
federal actions across ideological scores. The clear downward trend indicates that increased 
conservatism decreases the chance of success for both federal and local action. In contrast to 
claims by conservative pundits (see Ladd 2012, West 2012), conservatives do not oppose federal 
regulations; instead, they appear to oppose all regulations. 
Figure 2 illustrates the total effect of precedent by comparing federal action without conflict to 
local action with conflict across ideological scores. As above, the presence of conflict lowers the 
likelihood of success significantly, in line with precedent. These two factors alone can decrease a 
law’s chance of survival by more than 50%, emphasizing the importance of precedent. Overall, 
these results support an understanding of the commerce clause which considers both ideology 
and precedent. Both effects are substantively and statistically significant, suggesting that justices 
are not single-minded policy seekers: instead, they look to move toward their preferred ideology 
while constrained by precedential considerations. Overall, these models are fairly successful at 
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correctly classifying cases. Without any information about the law or other interested actors 
(perhaps industry amici), the models are able to reduce error by 15-18%. 
Jurisprudential regimes 
Finally, I examine evidence for different eras of commerce clause jurisprudence. Table 3 
presents regressions for two commonly noted “shifts” in commerce clause jurisprudence: 
Wickard vs Filburn and United States vs Lopez. Indicator variables at these shifts are not 
statistically significant in either model, and the coefficients are similarly signed (and, in fact, 
close to identical) in both models. Despite the voluminous literature documenting the different 
jurisprudential regimes governing after Wickard and Lopez, the data show little evidence that the 
Court is weighing these standards differently in either time period. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The struggle to distinguish legal factors from attitudinal ones has been a significant concern in 
modern judicial politics. Contrasting works have yielded very different explanations for the same 
decisions, and much of the work emanating from the legal academy remains largely unutilized 
by social scientists (and vice versa).  
This work attempts to bridge this gap, unifying legal scholarship and social science principles 
into one consistent model. This model more accurately reflects the decisions that judges make: 
though they might like to decide cases based solely on attitudinal considerations, decisions are 
constrained by precedential factors. By incorporating both factors into one model, both models 
can be empirically tested and can begin to “speak” to one another. 
Testing this model largely confirmed both lines of scholarship. While the fact that states 
opposing other states has no effect is puzzling, these results strongly support claims stemming 
from the legal academy that conflict does matter and that states face higher burdens. In short, the 
tests laid out by the Court are more than mere dicta. Importantly, these results hold across 
ideological lines, suggesting that judges are tempering their own ideological preferences to more 
closely match precedent. 
This work leaves ample room for further study. Expansion of this type of modeling to other areas 
of jurisprudence will be helpful in determining to what extent legal factors matter. In addition, I 
hope to extend this work to model individual justice votes rather than simply case outcomes. 
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Some justices might be more swayed by precedent, while others might be more influenced by 
policy preferences, so individual modeling will allow a deeper glimpse into exactly why the 
Court acts the way it does. 
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Table 1: Logit Estimation for Various Precedent Factors 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Conflict -1.0398*  
 (0.3855)  
Support 0.2491  
 (0.3562)  
Local Action -1.5769** -1.3959** 
 (0.4572) (0.4785) 
Federal Conflict  -0.7642 
  (0.4218) 
Federal Support  0.6558 
  (0.7288) 
Local Conflict  -0.8641 
  (0.6424) 
Local Support  0.1631 
  (0.3823) 
Constant 1.7495 1.5327 
 (0.4457) (0.4541) 
   
Log Likelihood -122.42 122.392 
PRE 10.86% 10.38% 
N 191 190 
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Table 2: Logit Estimation for Precedent and Ideology 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Conflict -1.085*  -1.0625** 
 (0.4026)  (.3977) 
Support 0.4465  .4114 
 (0.375)  (.3799) 
Local Action -1.7741** -1.5686** -2.6755** 
 (0.4752) (0.4892) (.9206) 
Federal Conflict  -0.7257  
  (0.4299)  
Federal Support  0.7712  
  (0.7449)  
Local Conflict  -1.0493  
  (0.7272)  
Local Support  0.3734  
  (0.4003)  
Ideology -0.6902* -0.7146* -2.5226* 
 (0.3019) (0.3022) (1.3138) 
Ideology*Local 
Action 
  2.0411 
   (1.3586) 
Constant 1.7495 1.5327 3.0394 
 (0.4457) (0.4541) (.9240) 
    
Log Likelihood -117.017 -116.825 -116.3497 
 
PRE 16.77% 18.79% 14.51% 
N 188 188 188 
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Table 3: Logit Estimates for Various Jurisprudential Regimes 
 Model 5 Model 6 
Ideology -0.1904 -0.6181* 
 (0.3814) (0.296) 
Conflict -0.8859* -0.9536** 
 (0.3900) (0.3902) 
State Action -1.6109** -1.6442** 
 (0.4504) (0.4583) 
Pre-Wickard 1.1636  
 (0.6722)  
Post-Lopez  -0.1861 
  (0.513) 
Constant 1.7038 2.0402 
 (0.4881) (0.4764) 
   
Log Likelihood -116.148 -117.675 
PRE 13.36% 10.84% 
N 188 188 
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Figure 1: Predicted Success for Local and Federal Actors 
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Figure 2: Effect of Total Precedent on Predicted Success 
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